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The British National Health Service (NHS) celebrates its 70th birthday on  July 5, 2018. This article examines this 
anniversary through the lens of previous anniversaries. It examines seven documents close to each anniversary 
over a period of some 60 years, drawing on interpretive content analysis, based on the narrative dimensions 
of context (structure and finance); success or achievements; problems; and solutions or recommendations.  It 
finds that the anniversary documents tend to show change rather than consistency. For example, the Guillebaud 
Report tended to dismiss the problem of ageing populations, for it to reappear in 1979 and 1989, to fade in 2009, 
and reappear once more in 2017. Despite being downplayed or ignored in some years, the problems identified 
by most of the documents such as demography and technology are unlikely to disappear. Some solutions such 
as market-based reform have flowed and ebbed over the years, and the ‘solution’ of structural reorganisation in 
one year has become the ‘problem’ in a future year. While predicting the future is always hazardous, it can be said 
with some confidence that future anniversaries are likely to see discussion of similar themes.
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Introduction
The British National Health Service (NHS) celebrates its 
70th birthday on 5 July 2018 (https://www.england.nhs.uk/
nhs70/). This article examines this anniversary through the 
lens of previous anniversaries. Pollitt1 adopted a narrative 
approach to analyse the scope, dominant themes, proffered 
solutions, evidence base, key assumptions and style and 
presentation of ﬁve key UK public management reform white 
papers over a period of 41 years. His unit of analysis was 
the White Paper – an ofﬁcial document stating government 
policy. Each White Paper was treated as a narrative, with his 
core questions concerned with what the story was and how it 
was told. He stressed that white papers are a particular kind 
of story: tales of unsatisfactory pasts and better futures, or 
‘advocacy narratives’ with ‘happy endings.’ 
His analysis took the ‘long view,’ looking for both changes 
and continuities over time. He argued that the longitudional 
frame or long-term perspective had too often been sidelined 
in the public management literature, usually in favour of a 
tight focus on the latest developments, and on cross-sectional 
comparisons. 
This article differs from Pollitt1 in two main ways. First, it 
selects documents from as close to decennial anniversaries 
as possible. Second, this means that the documents are more 
varied than white papers, including green (consultative) 
and white papers, but also advisory committees and Royal 
Commissions. The documents are: Guillebaud2; Ministry 
of Health3; Royal Commission on the NHS4; Working for 
Patients5; The NHS. Modern. Dependable6; From Good to 
Great7; and The Long-term Sustainability of the NHS and 
Adult Social Care.8 Details of the broader context can be 
found in Klein9 and Timmins.10 
This article draws on interpretive content analyses that 
includes attention to both manifest and latent content, and 
centres on descriptive narratives, or themes, summarizing the 
collected and coded data.11 The coding was a mixture a priori 
or deductively generated coding (cf Pollitt1) and inductive or 
“emergent” coding. Put another way, it started with Pollitt’s 
themes of scope, dominant themes, proffered solutions, 
evidence base, key assumptions and style and presentation. 
However, it adapted this by developing a coding list from the 
first few documents by selecting a tentative list of topics that 
were found to be revealing or useful. In addition to key words 
(cf Pollitt1), it drew on connotative codes, which are based 
not on explicit words but on the overall or symbolic meaning 
of phrases or passages. This gives the narrative dimensions 
of context (structure and finance); success or achievements; 
problems; and solutions or recommendations. Due to the 
varied nature of the documents, not all dimensions are 
present. For example, the 1968 green paper is concerned with 
structure. Moreover, some of the dimensions can blend into 
one another. For example, finance can be seen as a problem. 
Tenth Anniversary
A Debate in the House of Commons to mark the tenth 
anniversary of the creation of the NHS was an ‘exercise in 
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mutual self-congratulation as Labour and Conservative 
speakers competed with each other in taking credit for the 
achievements of the NHS.’9 Similarly, according to Timmins12 
it was broadly positive, and a ‘matter of quiet congratulation.’ 
However he continued that it was calm only because the 
NHS had just weathered the first of its many major crises. 
The Guillebaud Committee was set up in 1953 by the 
Conservative government after NHS expenditure had far 
exceeded estimates. This committee was similar in some ways 
to a Royal Commission in that it asked independent experts 
to examine the NHS. Although the term ‘cost’ appeared in the 
title, the committee interpreted its terms of reference fairly 
widely, and examined other issues such as structure. 
Guillebaud (1956)
The Committee noted that the current net cost of the NHS 
as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) initially rose 
from 3.51% in 1948-1949 to a peak of 3.75% in 1949-1950 
before falling to 3.24% in 1953-1954 (p. 9). In a comparison 
with pre-war capital expenditure, capital expenditure in 1938-
1939 was more than three times as high as it was in 1952-
1953 (p. 33). Overall, the proportion of national investment 
devoted to the NHS has been very small indeed throughout 
the period and has never reached even 1% (p. 31). 
The Committee then turned to estimating the future funding 
of the NHS. It cited the Registrar General’s 1953 estimates: 
‘there is no justification for the alarm that has been expressed 
about the impact of an ‘ageing population’ on the cost of the 
NHS. Changes in age structure by themselves are calculated 
to increase the present cost of the Service to public funds by 
3 ½ per cent by 1971/1972. The Registrar General stated that 
one reason why the additional costs of more old people are 
insignificant is because only about one-fifth of expenditure 
is currently devoted to this age group. A second explanation 
is that the old group is currently receiving a lower standard 
of service than the main body of consumers (p. 40). The 
Committee appeared to accept this analysis: population 
changes in themselves are not likely to exert a very appreciable 
effect on the future cost of the NHS (p. 49). 
The Committee then turned to the general structure of the 
NHS. First, it considered the definition of an ‘adequate service’ 
(p. 49). It stated that it is ‘clearly inadequate now in the sense 
of meeting every demand justifiable on medical grounds.’ The 
advance of medical knowledge and rising public expectations 
continually placed new demands of the Service. ‘We conclude 
that in the absence of an objective and attainable standard of 
adequacy the service must … provide the best service possible 
within the limits of the available resources’ (p. 50). 
The Committee was very conscious of the fact that the NHS 
had only been operating for seven years. Despite certain 
weaknesses, the Service’s record since 1948 had been one of 
‘real and constructive achievement.’ It considered proposals 
for radical reorganisation from the 1948 ‘Tri-Partite’ system 
that essentially was based on the three existing branches of 
health service administration (see below): Executive Councils 
(bodies concerned with local primary care professionals 
such as general practitioners [GPs]); Hospitals (under some 
14 regional hospital boards [RHBs] and 330 local hospital 
management committees [HMCs])); and elected multi-
purpose local authorities that were concerned with public 
health and community nursing. The four proposals were: 
one local authority for all branches; hospitals transferred to 
the local authorities; transferring the work of the Executive 
Councils to the local authorities or RHBs; and a central 
National Board or Corporation. However, ‘we believe that 
unless an overwhelming case could be made out for any 
basic reorganisation of the Service, it would be in the best 
interests of the Service to leave the present administrative 
structure undisturbed (p. 53). The Report did not number 
its ‘Recommendations.’ However, most of these seem to be 
relatively minor in nature, while there are a large number of 
endorsements of the status quo: ‘we do not recommend….’
Twentieth Anniversary
According to Klein,9 ‘if the first decade of the NHS was the 
period of consolidation, the next decade and a half was a 
period of innovation.’ This period saw the Hospital Plan of 
1962, with the 15 years from 1960 to the mid-1970s a period 
of rapid growth in public expenditure (p. 49). However, the 
period also saw the first major reorganisation of the NHS. ‘In 
search of the organisational fix,’ Minister of Health Kenneth 
Robinson published the first consultative document on 
reorganisation in 1968, which was published to coincide with 
the NHS 20th anniversary.13 As the title suggests, the main 
focus was on the administrative structure of the NHS, and it 
was a ‘green’ or consultative paper. 
Ministry of Health (1968)
It was stated that while the 1948 framework was well suited to 
the immediate needs of the NHS, there was now widespread 
recognition that the time had come for that structure as 
a whole to be radically reconsidered. The proposals were 
‘entirely tentative,’ and subject to consultation. The NHS 
required the closest collaboration between doctors, nurses 
and other workers. ‘The central theme of this Green Paper 
must be the unified administration of the medical and related 
services in an area by one authority, in place of the multiplicity 
of authorities concerned in the present arrangements’ (p. 6). 
It recognised that hospital authorities were numerous: 14 
RHBs, 330 HMCs and 36 Boards of Governors for Teaching 
Hospitals, and health care in the local community was a 
divided responsibility: 134 Executive Councils and 175 local 
health authorities (HAs), and welfare services provided by local 
authorities. This ‘Tripartite’ structure was complex, consisting 
of two systems of finance, and varying population size. For 
example, there were 25 local HAs under 75 000 population 
but 6 with over 1 million. In short, the number of separate 
authorities in the present administrative structure was nearly 
700, with wide variations in size, resources, opportunity and 
scope. It suggested about 40-50 Area Boards, with advantages 
of having a broadly similar pattern to local government. 
Thirtieth Anniversary
Klein9 argued that if the start of the 1970s saw the apotheosis 
of paternalistic rationalism, with the 1974 reorganisation as 
its monument, the second half of the decade produced the 
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politics of disillusionment. As a result of the 1973 economic 
crisis, the average increase in the NHS budget of 4.3% under 
the 1970-1974 Conservative Government, but 1.5% under 
the 1974-1979 Labour Government. Moreover, the second 
half of the 1970s was a period of medical militancy and of 
trade union militancy. For the first time in the history of the 
NHS, doctors took industrial action, resulting in ‘the politics 
of ideological confrontation’ over pay beds (p. 85). Klein also 
pointed to ‘the politics of organisational statis’ and sense of 
crisis that led to the setting up of a Royal Commission on 
the NHS (p. 90; cf Timmins12). Klein noted that the Report 
both reflected the growing disillusionment and represented 
an attempt to maintain the consensus. It reaffirmed the basic 
philosophy of the NHS, and delivered an overwhelming – 
though not uncritical – endorsement of the NHS. In this 
respect it resembled the Guillebaud Report, but while that 
virtually silenced political argument about the NHS for 10 
years, the Royal Commission marked on the contrary the 
beginning of a new debate, with an incoming Conservative 
government of 1979. 
Report of the Royal Commission on the NHS (1979)
It opened by stating that it was appointed at a time when there 
was widespread concern about the NHS: a reorganisation 
which few had greeted as an unqualified success; industrial 
disputes; and a chill economic climate (p. 1). It noted that 
only Guillebaud had considered the NHS as a whole (p. 2). 
It stated that there was general agreement in evidence that 
the structure of the NHS needed slimming (p. 321), and it 
was considered that there is one management tier too many 
in most places (p. 325). The 1982 NHS reorganisation saw 
the area HAs created only in 1974 abolished, with the single 
tier below regional level being the District Health Authority 
(see eg, Timmins10). Like the Guillebaud Report, it argued 
that there was no objective or universally acceptable method 
of establishing what the ‘right’ level of expenditure on the 
NHS should be, but on balance their recommendations 
would increase the cost of the service (p. 353). It stated that 
its evidence contained a complete spectrum of descriptions 
of the present state of the NHS ranging from ‘the envy of the 
world’ to its being ‘on the point of collapse.’ Its judgement 
lay between these extremes (p. 13). In terms of international 
comparisons, it noted that the United Kingdom spent less than 
most over developed countries, and also performed relatively 
poorly in terms of indicators of health such as life expectancy, 
and perinatal and maternal mortality. It concluded ‘we need 
not seem ashamed of our health service and there are many 
aspects of it of which we can be justly proud’ (p. 27). It noted 
that ‘a common criticism is that the NHS is a sickness service 
rather than a health service’ (p. 35). It stated that easily the 
most popular remedy for the failings of the NHS, especially 
and understandably with those working in it, was that much 
more money should be made available. Others included 
alternative methods of financing (eg, charges); the NHS 
should be taken out of politics; integrating health and personal 
social services; and further NHS reorganisation (pp. 35-6). In 
contrast to Guillebaud, it suggested that demographic change 
of the growing number of old people and particularly those 
over 75, will be the greatest single influence on the shape of 
the NHS for the rest of the century (p. 379). In total it made 
117 recommendations, but few of great or lasting significance.
Fortieth Anniversary
According to Timmins,12 the worst financial crisis in the 
NHS’s history led to the Presidents of the three senior Royal 
Colleges appeal in public to the Conservative Government 
to “save our NHS.” This contributed towards the 1988 NHS 
Review, which led to the White Paper, ‘Working for Patients,’5 
and to the 1991 internal market. Klein9 characterised the 
period as ‘the politics of value for money’ (Ch 5) which led to 
‘the politics of the big bang’ (Ch 6) of the 1989 White Paper 
that marked the ‘end of consensus on the NHS’ in the biggest 
explosion of political anger and professional fury in the 
history of the NHS (p. 105). Put another way, the Presidents 
should perhaps have been careful what they wished for. They 
clearly saw ‘saving’ the NHS in terms of more money, but the 
Conservative Thatcher government introduced the ‘internal 
market’ or ‘purchaser/provider split’ which has been termed 
the biggest change in the history of the NHS, and shaped the 
policy direction of the NHS for the next twenty five years or 
so. 
Working for Patients (1989)
It was argued that the ‘structure’ of the NHS required 
change, but at face value, the document appears to be fairly 
anodyne. For example, it does not use term ‘internal market’ 
or ‘purchaser/provider split,’ although those terms were 
used by both sides in a Parliamentary Debate just before 
the document’s publication (Hansard House of Commons 
1988). Moreover, it reaffirmed the principles of the NHS: 
the NHS is, and will continue to be, open to all, regardless of 
income, and financed mainly out of general taxation [albeit a 
minimalist interpretation]. Turning to finance, it was stated 
that total gross expenditure on the NHS increased from some 
£8 billion in 1978-79 to £26 billion in 1989-1990, an increase 
of 40% after allowing for general inflation (p. 2). It stated 
that the NHS was growing at a truly remarkable pace: staff, 
expenditure, activity such as in-patients, and throughout the 
1980s the Government presided over a massive expansion 
of the NHS. The achievements of the NHS included high 
standards of health care, and longer lengths and quality of 
life. But – ‘the need for change’ – it had become increasingly 
clear that more needed to be done because of rising demand 
and an ever-widening range of treatments made possible by 
advances in medical technology (pp. 2-3). It was clear that 
the organisation of the NHS needed to be reformed. The 
Government wished to raise the performance of all hospitals 
and GP practices to that of the best. It was convinced that it can 
be done only be delegating responsibility as closely as possible 
to where health care is delivered to the patient (p. 3). It set out 
seven key measures: delegation of power and responsibility; 
self-governing hospitals of NHS Hospital Trusts; money able 
to cross administrative boundaries; 100 new consultant posts; 
large GP practices able to hold budgets; management bodies 
reduced in size and reformed on business lines; and medical 
audit (pp. 4-5). The central aims were to: to extend patient 
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choice; to delegate responsibility to those who are best placed 
to respond to patients’ needs and wishes; and to secure the 
best value for money. The Government would build further 
on the strengths of the NHS, while tackling its weaknesses. 
This would ensure that the NHS becomes an even stronger, 
more modern Service, more committed than ever to working 
for patients (p. 101). 
Although the term ‘market’ was not used, it discussed several 
key ingredients of a market. For example, an NHS Hospital 
Trust will earn its revenue from the services it provides, 
with the main source of revenue from contracts (p. 24). 
Incentives were stressed: the practices and hospitals which 
attract the most custom will receive the most money (p. 48). 
The public and private sectors should working together. The 
Government expected to see further increases in the number 
of people wishing to make private provision for health care, 
and so allowed tax relief for retired people (pp. 6-7). There 
was already a growing partnership between the NHS and the 
independent health sector. The Government believed there 
was considerable scope for building on these initiatives: GPs 
and HAs would be able to use NHS funds to pay for some 
private sector treatments ‘if this offered better quality or 
better value for money than buying NHS services’ (p. 68). The 
Government believed that there was scope for much wider 
use of competitive tendering, beyond the non-clinical support 
services which formed the bulk of tendering so far. This could 
extend as far as the wholesale ‘buying in’ of treatments for 
patients from private hospitals and clinics, which had proved 
effective under the Government’s waiting list initiative (p. 70). 
Taken together the reforms amounted to ‘the most significant 
review of the NHS in its 40-year history’ (p. 100). 
Fiftieth Anniversary
During the 1997 Election Labour claimed that the nation 
had ‘14 days to save the NHS.’ The Labour landslide saw ‘the 
politics of the third way,’9 with the production of a White 
Paper some six months later. 
The NHS. Modern. Dependable (1997)
The White Paper contained a Foreword by Labour Prime 
Minister Tony Blair that stated that ‘creating the NHS was 
the greatest act of modernisation ever achieved by a Labour 
Government.’ However, the NHS needed to modernise in 
order to meet the demands of today’s public. In short, he 
wanted the NHS to become a modern and dependable service 
that is once more the envy of the world. Problems included 
long waiting lists; variable quality; and an NHS that treated 
people when they were ill rather than one that worked with 
others to improve health and reduce health inequalities. The 
document rejected those who argued that the NHS could 
not accommodate these pressures and would need huge 
increases in taxation, a move to a charge-based service, or 
radical restrictions in patient care. ‘So do the public.’ It argued 
that the pressures on the NHS were- and always have been- 
exaggerated. It noted that Bevan stated some 50 years ago 
that “expectations will always exceed capacity.” It continued 
that ‘Likewise demographic pressures can be overstated.’ 
However, the NHS had to change. It had to modernise to 
meet the demands of a new century. The document stated 
that the internal market would be replaced by a system 
of ‘integrated care,’ based on partnership and driven by 
performance, where cooperation would replace competition. 
It formed the basis for a ten year programme to renew and 
improve the NHS through evolutionary change rather than 
organisational upheaval. These changes would build on what 
has worked, but discard what has failed. However, although 
it would not mean a wholesale structural upheaval, new 
institutions such as new local commissioners of Primary 
Care Groups would be created. At the national level, there 
would be new institutions such as the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (to give a strong lead on clinical and cost-
effectiveness), the Commission for Health Improvement (to 
support and oversee the quality of clinical services at local 
level, and to tackle shortcomings) and National Service 
Frameworks. The Government stated it would raise spending 
in real terms every year. The Government committed itself 
anew to the historic principle of the NHS: that if you are ill 
or injured there will be a national health service there to help; 
and access to it will be based on need and need alone. The 
White Paper aimed to renew the NHS as a one-nation health 
service offering fairness and consistency to the population as 
a whole, with improvements in quality and efﬁciency; speed 
of access to care; and improved health status and reduced 
health inequalities. But 3 years into a 10-year plan, after a 
change of Secretary of State, the NHS Plan of 2000 reversed 
direction, ramping up the market that Labour had claimed to 
abolish only some 1000 days earlier. 
Sixtieth Anniversary
‘The politics of transition’9 covered the Brown premiership, 
which was a period of transition from political stability 
to political uncertainty, from an era of optimism about 
the economic future to one of anxiety, and also a period of 
transition for the NHS: from market creation to market 
shaping. It produced a ‘pandemic of visions’ (p. 253) such 
as the Darzi Report,14 but also moves ‘towards the fiscal ice 
age’ (p. 256). Timmins12 regards the NHS at 60 as the ‘calm 
before the storm.’ He noted that the Darzi Report set out 
the set of challenges facing the NHS in the 21st century: 
rising expectations; demand driven by demographics; 
the continuing development of our ‘information society’; 
advances in treatments; the changing nature of disease; and 
changing expectations of the health workplace. A White 
Paper of 2009 built on and implemented Darzi’s vision. 
NHS 2010–2015: From Good to Great (2009)
The document began in celebratory mode: 15 years ago, the 
NHS had sunk to such a low ebb that many voiced doubts over 
its long-term survival. It was a huge turnaround in fortunes 
and a great success story. It had gone from struggling to 
generally good, but a new ambition would take it ‘from good 
to great’ implementing our vision of a preventative, people-
centred, productive NHS. The document pointed to a decade 
of record, sustained investment which meant that funding 
doubled in real terms over the last 12 years and was almost 
exactly the average among the Organisation for Economic 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. It stated 
that the following year, the NHS would receive a substantial 
increase in funding and the Pre-Budget Report has confirmed 
that this uplift will be locked in to frontline budgets for the 2 
years that follow. All this meant that the NHS had made huge 
progress over the last decade. Care had improved, and NHS 
waiting times were the shortest they have been since NHS 
records began. Moreover, the NHS, and the values it proclaims 
to the world, was one of the best things about Britain today. 
First and most important, it is founded on strong values that 
bind us all together. The NHS will continue to be based on 
these values and provide care based on need and not on ability 
to pay. 
Almost as an after-thought, the elephant in the room was 
mentioned: finding some £15 20 billion in ‘efficiency savings’ 
over the 3-year period from April 2011. The tariff payment 
system would have a maximum uplift of 0% for the next 4 
years, which will ‘drive all providers to become as efficient 
as the highest performers’ (p. 51). There was no mention 
of the other elephant in the room of the ‘Mid Staffordshire’ 
scandal (see Klein9). However, a change in Government in 
the 2010 Election led to a very different vision and the ‘the 
politics of confrontation’ over the 2010 White Paper ‘Equity 
and Excellence.’9 
Seventieth Anniversary
The 70th anniversary is set within the longest financial 
squeeze in the history of the NHS, and widespread concerns 
of ‘crisis.’
The Long-term Sustainability of the NHS and Adult Social 
Care (2017)
It stated that our NHS was in crisis and the adult social care 
system was on the brink of collapse. ‘Our conclusion could 
not be clearer. Is the NHS and adult social care system 
sustainable? Yes, it is. Is it sustainable as it is today? No, it is 
not. Things need to change.’
It noted that the NHS had survived a long series of crises 
since its foundation. Accusations of underfunding, back-door 
privatisation and unnecessary reorganisations, have plagued 
successive Secretaries of State for Health. Many witnesses 
portrayed an NHS at breaking point. However, ‘this crisis is 
different from the other crises.’ It concluded that ‘whatever 
short-term measures may be implemented to muddle through 
today, a better tomorrow is going to require a more radical 
change.’
While the NHS had evolved considerably since 1948, the 
drivers of change—from demographic factors and changing 
disease patterns, to technological and medical advances, 
income effects and increasing relative health care costs—were 
intensifying at a relentless pace and fuelling rising public 
expectations. The system, which was originally designed to 
treat short-term episodes of ill health was now caring for a 
patient population with more long-term conditions, more co-
morbidities and increasingly complex needs. It noted that in 
comparative terms, the United Kingdom had historically spent 
less on health when compared with other nations, has fewer 
hospital beds, fewer doctors and fewer nurses per head, and 
often worse outcomes for survival from stroke, heart attacks 
and many cancers. Other problems included a culture of 
short-termism; low productivity; wide variations in provider 
performance; slow adoption of new technologies; lack of 
integration between health and social care; and a lack of focus 
on prevention. The Commission made 34 Recommendations 
including that health spending beyond 2020 should increase 
at least in line with the growth of gross domestic product 
(GDP); service transformation; and the establishment of an 
Office for Health and Care Sustainability. 
Discussion and Conclusions
Writing for the 60th Anniversary of the NHS, Timmins12 
stated that his brief history of the big anniversaries 
demonstrates ‘plus ça change’ – that many of the issues that 
the NHS is grappling with right now, and will continue to 
grapple with, always have been there. For example, he claimed 
that the pressures first clearly spelled out more than 50 years 
ago in the Guillebaud report – ageing populations, the cost of 
technological advance and rising expectations – remain.
The Anniversary documents (Table) suggest some continuities. 
For example, paralleling some of Pollitt’s conclusions, these 
include the elusiveness of the impacts of management change, 
with none of the documents offering a clear set of targets or 
yardsticks by which ‘success’ or ‘failure’ could subsequently 
be judged, and the thinness of evidence underpinning the 
reforms proposed. Other ‘constants’ include affirmations of 
the principles of the NHS. For example, as the House of Lords 
Commission8 put it, we strongly recommend that a tax-funded, 
free-at-the-point-of-use NHS should remain in place as the 
most appropriate model for delivery of sustainable health 
services both now and in the future. However, the NHS has 
seen some version of ‘Groundhog Day’ in that for many years 
reports have stressed the visions such as integrated, seamless 
and more person-centred care; more care delivered in primary 
and community settings, and a greater focus on prevention. 
Moreover, many of these visions are common to other health 
care systems. For example, according to the Parliamentary 
Review of Health and Social Care in Wales,15 the vision for 
care that Wales should achieve is one being pursued by most 
developed nations in the face of similar circumstances. This 
is to revolutionise care so that it empowers individuals to 
take decisions, tailors care to the individual’s expressed needs 
and preferences, is far more proactive and preventative, is 
provided as close as possible to people’s homes, is seamless, 
and is of the highest quality. Its High Level Recommendations 
include: Bold New Models of Seamless Care; Put the People 
in Control; Harness Innovation, and Accelerate Technology 
and Infrastructure Developments; A Health & Care System 
that’s always learning. However, it stated that ‘nobody we 
spoke to during the course of this Review disagreed with our 
assessment that the case for change is compelling.’ It then 
posed the question: ‘If the case for change is compelling, then 
why hasn’t it compelled?’ (p. 5).
However, in the main, the anniversary documents tend to 
show change rather than consistency. For example, contrary to 
Timmins12 claims, the Guillebaud Report tended to dismiss the 
problem of ageing populations, for it to reappear in 1979 and 
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Table. The Anniversary Documents
Anniversary Period (Klein 2013) Government Key Document Key Themes
1958 Consolidation Conservative (1951-1964) Guillebaud (1956)
Structure: No case for major reorganisation 
Finance: NHS not out of financial control; required more 
investment 
Achievements: Record of real and constructive achievement
Problems: Little concern over population ageing 




National Health Service: the 
Administrative Structure 
of the Medical and Related 
Services in England and 
Wales (1968)
Structure: Tri-partitite system
Problem: Lack of integration; structure needs to be radically 
reconsidered
Solutions: Central theme of unified administration in an area by 
one authority
1978 Disillusionment Labour (1974-1979)
Report of the Royal 
Commission on the National 
Health Service (1979)
Structure: Needed slimming, with one management tier too many 
in most places
Finance: Difficult to establish the ‘right’ level of expenditure, 
but on balance recommendations would increase the cost of the 
service
Achievements: Largely positive, but poor international 
comparisons
Problems: Ageing







1997) Working for Patients (1989)
Structure: New institutions of Hospital Trusts and GPFH 
introduced within an ‘internal market’
Finance: Real increase in expenditure of about 40% over 10 years
Achievements: High standards of health care, and longer length 
and quality of life. 
Problems: Lack of incentives
Solutions: Internal market
1998 Third Way Labour (1997-2010) The New NHS (1997)
Structure: No wholesale structural upheaval, but some new 
national and local institutions
Finance: The Government stated it would raise spending in real 
terms every year
Achievements: The historic principle of the NHS with access based 
on need and need alone
Problems: Demographic pressures can be overstated 
Solutions: Internal market replaced by a system of 'integrated 
care'
2008 Transition Labour (1997-2010) From Good to Great (2009)
Structure:  No change suggested
Finance: NHS expenditure had doubled in real terms since Labour 
took office in 1997
Achievements: Celebratory and optimistic; NHS based on strong 
values; recent positive record
Problems: Downplayed Darzi challenge of demographic change; 
coming austerity; and scandal 









The Long-term Sustainability 
of the NHS and Adult Social 
Care (2017)
Structure: Lack of integration between health and social care
Finance: Insufficient funding; ‘crisis’ point
Problems: Demographic challenge; relatively poor international 
comparisons 
Solutions: 34 Recommendations
Abbreviations: GPFH, general practitioner fund holding; NHS, National Health Service; NA, not applicable.
.
1989, to fade in 2009, and reappear once more in 2017. While 
some tend to stress positive internal evaluations (sometimes 
more related to principles than delivery) (eg, Guillebaud,2 
Royal Commission4), others pointed to more negative external 
comparisons (eg, Royal Commission4; House of Lord8). The 
Royal Commission of 1979 seemed to provide a two way bet of 
a largely positive evaluation; but relatively poor comparative 
performance. While a more modern service in 1989 meant a 
‘market,’ modernisation in 1997 meant abolishing the market 
in favour of integrated care. However, Guillebaud2 discussed 
and rejected solutions to increase integration, and the 1968 
Green Paper had a ‘central theme of unified administration.’ 
While Guillebaud considered that it was too early to consider 
reorganisation, a document 12 years later searched for the 
‘organisational fix,’ that has led to an almost continual search 
for the perfect structure since that time that has featured some 
Powell
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of the solutions discussed but rejected by Guillebaud.2 
Despite being downplayed or ignored in some years, the 
problems identified by most of the documents such as 
demography and technology are unlikely to disappear. Some 
solutions such as market-based reform have flowed and ebbed 
over the years, and the ‘solution’ of structural reorganisation 
in one year has become the ‘problem’ in a future year. While 
predicting the future is always hazardous, it can be said with 
some confidence that future anniversaries are likely to see 
discussions of similar themes. 
In conclusion, and in terms of the narrative dimensions, there 
has been little agreement on structure over the 70 years, but a 
broad agreement that more expenditure is required (but a lack 
of clarity of how much). While there is some continuity in 
discussions of achievements, problems such as demographic 
challenges appear to vary over time. Perhaps most importantly, 
solutions exhibit both continuity and change. However, while 
some solutions such as marketisation have ebbed and flowed 
over time, other solutions such as prevention and care closer 
to home are hardy perennials, but this merely suggests that 
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